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I. INTRODUCTION: MAPPING THE ORIGINS AND POTENTIAL FUTURE
OF DEVELOPMENT
International development is generally lauded as an altruistic
global effort for the betterment of humankind. But it is national
governments that give official development assistance, often to
other governments. They do this for reasons of national interest, out
of a common recognition of state responsibility to their own
citizens, and as part of the international community. To this point,
for example, the long title of the main United States government
authority for foreign aid, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended—the very first sentence—is: “AN ACT To promote the
foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by
assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic
development and internal and external security . . . .”1
In 2019, the forty-five countries that make up the longstanding
consortium of traditional donors of official development assistance
1. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961).
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(ODA) to developing countries gave almost $156 billion in
ODA funding for aid in other countries.2 This is an objectively very
large sum (though it only comes to about 0.3% of their gross
national incomes on average).3 What do the donor governments
expect to come of their voluntary foreign assistance? What do
the recipient governments and their citizens expect? Who is
accountable for which inputs and which outputs? What does a state
owe to its people?
In international relations, purportedly longstanding principles
have dictated that governments have absolute territorial
sovereignty—absolute discretion on how to manage their internal
governance and relationships with their citizens. Yet, throughout
the history of the state, there have always been practical standards
for legitimate and functional statehood. In the post-Cold War era,
for various reasons, the international community recognized a state
level “responsibility to protect” (R2P), acknowledging that there
may be a limit to absolute sovereignty when a state’s failure
or refusal to provide security to its own people—to respect
and protect their liberty—creates domestic instability that
threatens international security.4 In such circumstances, the
international community may invoke R2P to justify international
humanitarian intervention.
A separate discourse that predates but has not progressed as
much as R2P concerns state and international responsibilities
regarding international development assistance. Human rights
advocates and developing countries have asserted a human “right
to development” (RTD).5 Governments of more economically
advanced countries (hereinafter, “donor governments”) have
balked at the assertion of development as a right, out of fear that
this concept could be used to create a binding international
commitment to provide development assistance—which would
2. Net ODA, OECD ILIBRARY, https://data.oecd.org/chart/6doV (last visited
Dec. 25, 2020).
3. Id.
4. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION
AND
STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001) [hereinafter COMM’N ON INTERVENTION],
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf; see also S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17,
2011), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011).
5. G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development (Dec. 4, 1986),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/righttodevelopment.aspx.
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effectively compel them to provide development assistance and
undermine their foreign policy discretion.
This Article proposes to link the discourses with a new concept:
a “responsibility to develop” (R2D), as a necessary corollary to R2P
and a logical counterpart to RTD. It will review the history of state
sovereignty, demonstrating that it has always entailed domestic
and international commitments. It will then summarize the related
histories of domestic governance of the state at home and
“development” abroad to identify the state practices that have been
at least implicitly accepted as necessary for legitimate statehood.
II. SOVEREIGNTY: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC LEGITIMACY OF THE STATE (OR) HOW ABSOLUTE
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY WAS NEVER REALLY A THING
State sovereignty has always carried domestic responsibilities,
and the international community has always recognized
international implications of domestic governance. As the concept
of states evolved to obtain their legitimacy through popular
sovereignty—the will of the people—this recognition became all
the more relevant, notwithstanding brief assertions otherwise that
were never followed in practice.6 The international community can
set binding standards for domestic governance—for the state’s
relationship with its people. In fact, it always has.
A. The Enlightenment Era
1. Individual rights at the inception of the state
Conventional wisdom cites the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia as the
origin of the nation-state system, and often alludes to it as the
foundation of the concept of absolute domestic territorial
sovereignty and non-intervention by the international community
regarding domestic matters. But that is incomplete and
misleading.7 For most of the history of the nation-state,
international recognition was conditioned on domestic conduct.
The first treaty recognition of absolute, unconditional domestic
6. The idea of absolute domestic territorial sovereignty has been asserted much more
than it was ever followed. See infra Section I.B.1.
7. LUKE GLANVILLE, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A NEW
HISTORY 49 (2014).
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territorial sovereignty did not occur until the 1920 Covenant of the
League of Nations, where the state parties agreed “to respect and
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all Members of the League.”8 But
a brief survey of actual state practice over the past 500 years reflects
that the international community has always had certain
expectations for domestic governance.
State recognition of individual liberties domestically has been a
matter of international concern since the inception of the state.
Dating back to the Protestant Reformation in Europe in the 1520s,
there has been a consistent question of the state’s treatment of
religion, or individual liberty originally in service of religion.
Contemporary review of the Treaty of Westphalia shows that, by
its own terms and immediate effect, it established the idea of
international expectations of domestic governance and the
individual civil right of the free exercise of religion. For that matter,
the idea of free will of an individual (initially as a necessary element
of the practice of religion) goes back still centuries further, to at least
St. Augustine’s On the Free Choice of the Will around AD 395. The
1555 Treaty of Augsburg expressly established that rulers within
the Holy Roman Empire could dictate the religion of their regions,
“cuius regio eius religio” (he who rules, his is the religion), setting the
stage for the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48) between Catholic and
Protestant states.9 The Treaty of Westphalia, which ended that war,
included a section on “Liberty of Conscience,” requiring the state
parties (the German princely states of the Holy Roman Empire) to
tolerate the free exercise of religion of their subjects, i.e., to accept
and not discriminate against religious minorities (specifically,
Protestant or Catholic, within their jurisdictions).10 Far from
establishing absolute sovereignty over territory, it codified an
individual civil right: freedom of religion. So, if anything, the
8. Id. at 85; The Covenant of the League of Nations: Article 10, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN
GOLDMAN L. LIBR., https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp (last visited
Nov. 16, 2020).
9. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY 77 (Brendan Simms & D.J.B. Trim
eds., 2011); GLANVILLE, supra note 7, at 51–52.
10. GLANVILLE, supra note 7, at 51–52 (quoting the Treaty of Osnabruck 1969
art. XXVIII, 228–29); see also Treaty of Westphalia art. XXVIII, The Avalon Project,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp. The Treaty of Westphalia had
two parts: The Treaty of Osnabruck and the Treaty of Muenster; the clause is in the
former part.
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Treaty of Westphalia stands for the principle of states’ acceptance
of domestic governance responsibilities and the international
community’s willingness to hold them accountable for it.
2. Popular sovereignty: State legitimacy through the will of the people
The next step in the evolution of sovereignty was domestic:
popular sovereignty. Several Enlightenment-era revolutions
posited that the legitimacy of the state should come from the
consent of the governed and its representation of the general will
of the people. The concept built steadily through influential
treatises and state practice.
In 1651, Thomas Hobbes wrote in Leviathan that the state is
responsible for the security of its people, on behalf of its people:
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able
to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries
of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by
their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may
nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their
power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of
men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto
one Will . . . . This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall
Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant
of every man with every man . . . . This done, the Multitude so
united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH . . . . This is
the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake
more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe, under
the Immortall God, our peace and defence [,] . . . inabled to forme
the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against
their enemies abroad.11

This is a clear assertion of a concept of state responsibility to
protect its people. It is also a clear assertion that, respecting
individuals’ liberty in a state of nature and free will to choose to
collaborate with others, the state’s authority comes from acting on
behalf of its people.
An important next step in practice for state accountability to its
people was the “Glorious” Revolution in England in 1688.
It removed a Catholic king, James II, from power over the
11. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 160–61 (Lerner Publ’g Grp. 2018) (1651) (spelling and
formatting in original).
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majority-Protestant population, and placed important new
limitations on the authority of the monarchy. The 1689 English Bill
of Rights recognized “ancient rights and liberties” of the people
individually and through their representatives in Parliament. 12
These included certain civil and political rights, such as free
elections; Parliament’s power to make laws; freedom of speech
within Parliament; the right of petition; and prohibitions of
excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments.13
In the same period, John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government
(1689) elaborated on the legitimacy of the English government,
specifically, Parliament. It starts with natural rights of man:
asserting a law of nature for all mankind, “that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health,
liberty, or possessions.”14 These individuals exchange some of their
natural liberty for “the bonds of civil society” to “unite into a
community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one
amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a
greater security against any that are not of it.”15 This civil society,
in turn, has the authority to remove its representative government,
to hold it accountable:
[T]here remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter
the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust
reposed in them. For all power given with trust for the attaining an
end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly
neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and
the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it . . . .16

Thus framed, a representative government receives its
legitimacy from popular sovereignty, with a duty to serve the
general will of the people. In other words, it owes a duty of care to
its people.

12. English Bill of Rights 1689, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBR.,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2020);
John D. Bessler, A Century in the Making: The Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution, and
the Origins of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment, 27 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 989,
1015 (2019).
13. Bessler, supra note 12, at 1015.
14. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 4 (Richard Cox ed., 1982).
15. Id. at 58.
16. Id. at 92.
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Next in the progression of Western thought, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s On the Social Contract (1762) put forward ideas echoed
in the American and French revolutions. First, he explained,
legitimacy matters:
Force is a physical power; I fail to see what morality can result
from its effects. To give in to force is an act of necessity, not of
will . . . . If one must obey because of force, one need not do so out
of duty; and if one is no longer forced to obey, one is no longer
obliged. Clearly then, this word “right” adds nothing to force . . . .
Let us then agree that force does not bring about right and that
one is obliged to obey only legitimate powers.17

That legitimacy is determined by the general will:
Each of us places his person and all his power in common under the
supreme direction of the general will . . . . At once, in place of the
individual person of each contracting party, this act of association
produces a moral and collective body . . . which receives from this
same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will. This public
person, formed thus . . . is called state by its members when it is
passive, sovereign when it is active . . . . As for the associates, they
collectively take the name people; individually they are called
citizens, insofar as they are participants in the sovereign authority,
and subjects, insofar as they are subjected to the laws of the state.18

Thus, according to Rousseau, the representative state owes its
people something—something agreed to and consolidated into the
general will.
The United States Declaration of Independence in 1776
similarly framed the legitimacy of the state on accountability to the
people based on its effectiveness in ensuring individual rights:
WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness—That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the
Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation

17. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 71–72 (Donald A. Cress
trans., 2d ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2019).
18. Id. at 80.
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on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.19

The U.S. Constitution in 1787 itself further emphasized the
principle that sovereignty was bestowed on the state by the people,
for the benefit of the people:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.20

Before even getting into the details of a Bill of Rights—and,
later, a proposed second Bill of Rights—the founding documents
indicate a duty placed by the people onto the state to provide
domestic stability, security, individual liberty, and other elements
deemed necessary for the common good. Similarly, at the outset of
the French Revolution, the French National Assembly approved the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789, which
asserted, “The aim of all political association is the preservation of
the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are
liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.”21
The political philosophy of the Enlightenment era established
the baseline for modern political thought. As demonstrated by the
way these ideas have been enshrined in the founding documents of
England and the United States, and the way they have since come
into common acceptance by other states, the legitimacy of a state
government founded on popular sovereignty is tied to its
commitment to respect certain individual rights.
3. A brief counter-revolution: A short period of opportunistic reactionary
non-intervention that was notable for multiple interventions
The idea that a state’s legitimacy is based on popular
sovereignty was a clear threat to non-democratic governments.
Predictably, democratically illegitimate regimes responded by
19. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
20. The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription, NAT’L ARCHIVES (May 4, 2020),
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript.
21. Declaration of the Rights of Man—1789: Article 2, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN GOLDMAN L.
LIBR., https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2020).
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asserting that questions of state legitimacy are purely domestic
issues and none of the business of the international community. The
idea of absolute domestic territorial sovereignty thus became a
useful tool for democratically illegitimate regimes or purposes.
As part of France’s popular revolution, the French National
Assembly even went so far as to issue the Edict of Fraternity in 1792,
promising “fraternity and aid to all peoples who wish to recover
their liberty.”22 They went too far. The domestic politics of one
country, France, became a direct threat to the security of other states
and international stability.
The resulting Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars led to the
Congress of Vienna in 1815, which redrew territorial borders
among the five Great Powers (France, Britain, Russia, Austria, and
Prussia) and expressly reaffirmed monarchical, or dynastic, rule—
a direct repudiation of one of the fundamental pillars of popular
sovereignty, the right of the people to replace their government.23
To be clear, this was not some significant intellectual shift. It was
not even initially proposed by the allied Great Powers who
defeated Napoleon in 1814. It was a strategic argument by France’s
representative, Charles-Maurice Tallyrand, to force those other
four Great Powers to recognize a restored French monarchy, in
light of their own claims to territorial sovereignty.24 He argued that
France had been motivated by its advocacy of sovereignty of the
people, and the effect of the agreements of the 1815 Vienna
Congress—specifically, the “Final Act of the Congress”—was to
maintain the domestic monarchies.25 The Final Act reaffirmed
monarchical rule in Europe; therefore, the King of France should be
reinstated and its territorial integrity also respected.26 Thus, the
representative of France, which had previously justified foreign
intervention based on the principle of state legitimacy based on
popular sovereignty, argued:

22. GLANVILLE, supra note 7, at 71.
23. CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT, THE MORAL PURPOSE OF THE STATE: CULTURE, SOCIAL
IDENTITY, AND INSTITUTIONAL RATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 136–39 (1999). The
Vienna Congress did many other things, too, including laying down an international marker
of opposition to slavery on moral and humanitarian grounds.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 137.
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The presence of a minister of Louis XVIII[, the king of France, by
birthright,] consecrates here the principle upon which all social
order rests. The first need of Europe is to banish forever the
opinion that right can be acquired by conquest alone, and to cause
the revival of that sacred principle of legitimacy from which all
order and stability spring. To show today that France troubles
your deliberations, would be to say that true principles are no
longer the only ones that guide you, and that you are unwilling to
be just.27

And so, a group of monarchs agreed among themselves that
monarchs are legitimate and revolutions against them are not. This
is best understood, however, as a historical blip, not an actual
change in the trajectory of the perceived legitimacy of state power.
These monarchs asserted that no state should intervene to
support a popular revolution within another state. But they did not
establish any agreed principle or practice of non-intervention—of
complete deference to the internal governance of any state. They
very much recognized that “the internal politics of states could
represent a grave threat to international order.”28 They were far
from the pre-Westphalian expectation of absolute sovereignty of a
monarch. In fact, the practice was the opposite.
In the 1820s, three of the Great Powers—Russia, Prussia, and
Austria—formed a “Holy Alliance” to agree to intervene against
popular uprisings. They did so in Spain in 1820–21.29 In a joint
declaration, they rationalized that they had come “to the assistance
of a subdued Peoples, and they considered it as coming in support
of their liberty, and not as an attack against their independence . . .
the object of that policy will always be the preservation of the
Independence and of the rights of each State.”30 In other words,
they intervened in a matter of domestic stability based on concern
for international security.
The Great Powers also intervened repeatedly in the affairs and
territory of the Ottoman Empire to protect the religious freedom of

27. Id. at 137–38.
28. GLANVILLE, supra note 7, at 75.
29. Id.; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 9, at 122.
30. GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 253 (2004) (quoting the Declaration of the Allied
Sovereigns of Austria, Prussia and Russia (Laybach), 12 May 1821, in EDWARD HERTSLET,
THE MAP OF EUROPE BY TREATY 667–69 (1875)); GLANVILLE, supra note 7, at 75.
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the minority Christians. Russia took the role of protector of
orthodox Christians. The Crimean War between Russia and an
Ottoman-British alliance ended with the 1856 Treaty of Paris. That
treaty recognized the Ottoman Empire’s sovereignty, required
Russia to demilitarize the Black Sea, and required the Ottoman
Empire to establish domestic religious freedom and nondiscrimination against Christians in certain areas (e.g., taxation and
eligibility for public service).31 In 1860, in response to mass killings
of around 2,000 Christians in Damascus over a one-week period,
France advocated for joint European intervention for the purpose
“of obtaining the satisfaction due to humanity, and of assisting in the
reestablishment of peace in Syria.” 32 France negotiated with the other
European powers and the Ottoman Empire for consent for 12,000
European troops (half from France) to enter Ottoman territories to
end the pogroms against Christians. France obtained Ottoman
consent after explaining “that the reasons for the intervention were
related to the manifest impotence of the Ottoman authorities, which
made foreign help required if the collapse of the Ottoman Empire
were to be avoided.”33 By the time the troops actually arrived, the
killing had ended, and the troops found themselves carrying out
humanitarian activities, such as burying the dead and cleaning up
the wreckage.34 This episode presents an early example of
humanitarian intervention based on a mutually agreed failure of a
state’s responsibility to protect certain guaranteed domestic rights
(in this case, the civil right of religious freedom).
4. Non-intervention in the public discourse: The long history of talk by
commentators (with no relation to the actual actions of governments)
Though hardly ever implemented in practice, the idea of nonintervention has a long history in theory. The question of whether
to intervene into the domestic affairs of another state predates the
Westphalian state itself. Hugo Grotius rationalized in his 1625
foundational treatise, On the Law of War and Peace (de jure belli ac
pacis), if “a prince ‘should inflict upon his subjects such treatment

31. Treaty of Paris of 1856 art. IX, Mar. 30, 1856, https://content.ecf.org.il/files/
M00934_TreatyOfParis1856English.pdf; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 9, at 186.
32. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 9, at 173.
33. Id. at 173–74.
34. Id. at 175–76.
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as no one is warranted in inflicting, the exercise of the right vested
in human society is not precluded.’”35 In other words, when a
sovereign mistreats his people, the international community
outside his kingdom might have a right to intervene.
By contrast, the idea of absolute sovereignty over a territory is
attributed to Emmerich de Vattel and his contemporary, Christian
Wolff. Vattel’s treatise, The Law of Nations, published in 1758, used
popular sovereignty as an argument against intervention.
He asserted:
A nation then is mistress of her own actions so long as they
do not affect the proper and perfect rights of any other nation—
so long as she is only internally bound, and does not lie under any
external and perfect obligation. If she makes an ill use of her liberty,
she is guilty of a breach of duty; but other nations are bound
to acquiesce in her conduct, since they have no right to dictate
to her.36

If a state is internally legitimate, Vattel opines that there should
be no space for external input on its conduct. That was his opinion,
notwithstanding the actual state practice in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century Europe. Simms and Trim put it best: “[T]he
concept of inviolable state sovereignty was not so much elaborated
by Wolff and Vattel as simply invented by them.”37 That said, even
Vattel conceded that there may be a basis for intervention for civil
war or crimes against humanity—specifically, violation of the civil
right of freedom of religion.38
A century later, another prominent proponent of nonintervention, J.S. Mill, argued against intervention against another
state if that state’s government is legitimized by popular
sovereignty (i.e., represents the will of the people). At the same
time, he conceded that popular sovereignty depends upon the
condition of domestic liberty of the people within the state—how
free and able they are to shape their government. That domestic
35. Id. at 40 (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 584 (Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1925) (1625)).
36. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS lxiii (Joseph Chitty ed., 1844) (1758),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Lieber_Collection/pdf/DeVattel_LawOfNati
ons.pdf#page=60.
37. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 9, at 91 (citing Stephen D. Krasner,
Rethinking the Sovereign State Model, 27 REV. INT’L STUDS. 17 (2001)).
38. VATTEL, supra note 36, at 55.
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liberty depends on the level of “civilization” of the people.39 Thus,
he advocated for popular sovereignty, while defending colonialism
as a form of international development assistance. Granted, to be
charitable, his language was representative of his time and place as
a British colonial officer in India. In his 1859 essay, A Few Words on
Non-Intervention, Mill rationalized that if a state is legitimate by
way of popular sovereignty, i.e., reflecting the general will of the
people, then it ought to be able to stand on its own; it should not
need or expect external intervention to maintain stability. 40 If
anything, as long as it is not causing harm in the international
community, a state—along with all other states in the international
community—has an interest in collective self-defense against any
foreign intervention that seeks to alter the internally negotiated
governing relationship between the state and its people.41 In a
legitimate government, the expectations of the people and the
duties of the state are a matter of internal negotiation. He wrote:
With respect to the question, whether one country is justified
in helping the people of another in a struggle against their
government for free institutions[:] When the contest is only with
native rulers, and with such native strength as those rulers can
enlist in their defence, the answer I should give to the question of
the legitimacy of intervention is, as a general rule, No. . . . The
only test possessing any real value, of a people’s having become
fit for popular institutions, is that they, or a sufficient portion of
them to prevail in the contest, are willing to brave labour and
danger for their liberation. I know all that may be said, I know it
may be urged that the virtues of freemen cannot be learnt in the
school of slavery, and that if a people are not fit for freedom,
to have any chance of becoming so they must first be free.
And this would be conclusive, if the intervention recommended
would really give them freedom. But the evil is, that if they have
not sufficient love of liberty to be able to wrest it from
merely domestic oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on
them by other hands than their own, will have nothing real,
nothing permanent.42

39. MICHAEL W. DOYLE, THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION: JOHN STUART MILL AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 222–23 (2015).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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To Mill, the government of a state is legitimate if based on the
consent of the governed exercising their free will; that internal
legitimacy cannot be externally imposed. He allowed for
intervention against foreign invasion and civil wars as a matter of
mutual self-defense and international security interests.43 Foreign
intervention to establish freedom, he concluded, is wrong, but—
again, as an apologist for colonial occupations—he also argued that
the state has a responsibility to groom its people for freedom. In his
1856 treatise, On Liberty, he reasoned that the state may only restrict
individuals in the exercise of their freedom insofar as they may
harm others, but may restrict “uncivilized peoples” to the extent
that the state actively helps them reach the so-called civilized state
at which they are capable of exercising their liberty:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. . . .
[T]his doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the
maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children . . . .
Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by
others, must be protected against their own actions as well as
against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of
consideration those backward states of society in which the race
itself may be considered as in its nonage. . . . Despotism is a
legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians,
provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified
by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no
application to any state of things anterior to the time when
mankind have become capable of being improved by free and
equal discussion.44

So, free people have the right and authority to legitimize their
state. And toward that end, the state has a duty to respect and, as
necessary, cultivate their capacity to exercise their freedom. This is
an important argument in the history of foreign aid, which is very
much rooted in colonial and missionary zeal, but it also informs

43. Id. at 221, 225.
44. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13–14 (1859).
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present expectations of all states regarding the range of human
rights: economic, social, cultural, political, and civil.
All that said, these were just opinions of thinkers, not binding
on the actions of states. They nevertheless demonstrate how
attitudes towards sovereignty have shifted up to the current time
and influenced modern state practice.
B. The Modern Multilateral System
The Enlightenment Era advanced the form and content of the
state, including its relations with its people and with other states. It
established the international community and began to outline what
states should expect of other states in their relations with their
people. It did not, however, establish a tradition of nonintervention. Far from it. In the modern era, the international
community created the multilateral system of international
organizations to further define their expectations of domestic
governance and mediate their international relations. The concept
of absolute territorial sovereignty would become an artifact of the
first failed attempt at forming the multilateral system.
1. The League of Nations: The first, brief, limited recognition of absolute
territorial sovereignty
The international community unambiguously bound itself to
non-intervention based on absolute territorial sovereignty for the
first time in 1920—relatively recently in the history of the state—
and that decision had almost immediate, disastrous results. In the
wake of World War I, the 1920 Covenant of the League of Nations
stated, “The Members of the League undertake to respect and
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all Members of the League.”45
This absolute territorial sovereignty, without reference to any
expectations of internal governance, was further bolstered by a
stated principle of collective self-defense. Article 11 set out, “Any
war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the
Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of
concern to the whole League.”46 The concept was nonbinding, but

45. League of Nations Covenant art. 10.
46. Id. art. 11; see also id. art. 16.
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even so, it was too much for the United States Senate; a significant
majority of Senators did not want the United States to be obliged to
intervene. Even though the covenant was U.S. President Woodrow
Wilson’s idea, the United States Senate refused to ratify it.47 This
historical moment did not reject the possibility of humanitarian
interventions or the responsibilities of states to their people, but it
did reflect a recurring principle that influential states did not want
to be bound or compelled to intervene.
An interesting, little-known footnote to this story involves the
International Relief Union. In 1922, an Italian representative to the
League of Nations, who recalled surviving the Messina earthquake
of 1908, proposed a sub-organ for the League that would
implement a mutual commitment to humanitarian aid in response
to natural disasters—he even initially termed it a “right to relief.”48
Though not a party, the United States viewed this potential new
norm as a threat to foreign policy discretion, so it worked with
Britain’s representative to defeat it. They did not want to be
obligated to intervene. One account summarized,
[F]rom the outset, the United States had seen the . . . project as a
dangerous foreign scheme that threatened US values by involving
governments in disaster relief based on the idea of mutual
insurance, and potentially jeopardized their determination to use
disaster relief as an instrument of US foreign policy. 49

As much as the concept of absolute territorial sovereignty is
touted as individual states’ protection against international
intervention, it was also an excuse for the international community
not to intervene. And it was only a very brief moment in the history
of national and international rights and responsibilities.

47. The Senate and the League of Nations: Henry Cabot Lodge (1925), U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_item/Versailles.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2020) (summarizing Henry Cabot Lodge’s history of the Senate’s consideration of the Treaty
of Versailles).
48. John F. Hutchinson, Disasters and the International Order—II: The International Relief
Union, 23 INT’L HIST. REV. 253, 261 (2001).
49. Id. at 281.
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2. The United Nations: The post–World War II reemergence of state
responsibilities to their people and to each other
Just two decades later, the 1945 United Nations Charter set off
a march back to international expectations for the domestic conduct
of a state, eventually introducing the concept of “failed states” and
culminating with “the Responsibility to Protect.”50
The Charter establishing the United Nations in the wake of
World War II maintained respect for territorial sovereignty, but
significantly strengthened the collective self-defense mechanism. It
also reversed course from the League of Nations by setting up
universal expectations for domestic governance. Article 2(4) states,
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.”51 Further echoing the
Covenant of the League of Nations, with a significant addition,
Article 2(7) adds,
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII [Security Council
measures, including use of force].52

The Charter promises non-intervention, but also recognizes the
potential for domestic matters to create international security
threats. Chapter VII discusses potential international threats and
options for collective self-defense. Article 39 authorizes the U.N.
Security Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”53 Article 41
authorizes the Security Council to impose economic sanctions,
restrict travel and communication, or restrict diplomatic relations.54
Article 42 authorizes use of force: If Article 41 responses are
50. U.N. Charter; Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States,
89 FOREIGN POL’Y 3 (1992); COMM’N ON INTERVENTION, supra note 4.
51. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
52. Id. art. 2, ¶ 7.
53. Id. art. 39.
54. Id. art. 41.
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insufficient, the Security Council “may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security.”55 And Article 51 acknowledges
“the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”56 So,
the Charter forecloses interference into domestic affairs, but
contemplates action to respond to threats that cross borders.
For the next fifty years, the Cold War era, the questions of when
a country had crossed a line to be a threat to international security
warranting some sort of intervention focused on outward acts of
aggression and conflicts between governments, not internal
conflicts of governments with non-state actors, including their own
citizens.57 From 1945 to 1992, whatever the debates on the merits
were, proposals for intervention were vetoed in the Security
Council 279 times.58 This very short period in the history of
sovereignty ended with the fall of the Soviet Union and the “third
wave” of democratization in the late 1980s and 1990s.
a. Bringing state capacity back in: Responding to “failed states” and
“fragile states.” By the early 1990s, the international relations lexicon
gained terms like “fragile states” and “failed states.” Once again,
domestic governance—including the lack thereof—was
acknowledged as a source of threats to international peace and
security. In an oft-cited defining 1992 article, Saving Failed States,
Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner (a former U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations and an attorney in the U.S. Department of
State’s Office of the Legal Adviser, respectively) observed,
[A] disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nationstate, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the
international community. Civil strife, government breakdown,
and economic privation are creating more and more modem
debellatios, the term used in describing the destroyed German state

55. Id. art. 42.
56. Id. art. 51.
57. See, e.g., Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII—Action with Respect to Threats to
the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 39 & 51, CODIFICATION DIV.
PUBL’NS REPERTORY OF PRAC. OF U.N. ORGANS (Aug. 23, 2016) https://legal.un.org/
repertory/art39.shtml (summarizing practices since 1945).
58. U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peace-Keeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992).
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after World War II. As those states descend into violence and
anarchy—imperiling their own citizens and threatening their
neighbors through refugee flows, political instability, and random
warfare—it is becoming clear that something must be done. The
massive abuses of human rights—including that most basic of
rights, the right to life—are distressing enough, but the need to
help those states is made more critical by the evidence that their
problems tend to spread. Although alleviating the developing
world’s suffering has long been a major task, saving failed states
will prove a new—and in many ways different—challenge.59

For several reasons, the number of democratic governments in
the world increased dramatically during this period. Many of these
new democracies welcomed development assistance in the form of
democracy-promotion support from abroad. Donor governments
responded. For example, until this period, the United States
Government did not have any expressly stated democracypromotion authorities. In quick succession between 1985 and 1992,
the U.S. Congress passed the Central America Democracy, Peace,
and Development Initiative; the Support for East European
Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989; and the Freedom for Russia and
Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM)
Support Act of 1992.60
There was also a shift in views on access for humanitarian aid
for domestic crises (e.g., famine and internal displacement). In 1986,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in Nicaragua v. United
States that assistance provided by the United States to the military
and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua through 1984
was “a clear breach of the principle of non-intervention,” but added
in what some consider dicta,
The Court has however taken note that, with effect from the
beginning of the United States governmental financial year 1985
. . . , the United States Congress has restricted the use of funds
appropriated for assistance to the contras to “humanitarian
assistance” . . . . There can be no doubt that the provision of
strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country,

59. Helman & Ratner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 3.
60. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Title VII, Pub.
L. No. 99–83, § 701, 99 Stat. 190; Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-179, 103 Stat. 1298; Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies
and Open Markets Support Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-511, 106 Stat. 3320.
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whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be
regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way
contrary to international law.61

The ICJ thus countenanced the idea that foreign assistance to
mitigate the suffering of a state’s population would not necessarily
be a violation of its territorial or political sovereignty. It would not
necessarily undermine the state’s responsibility for the security of
its people, but it could help mitigate the consequences of its
apparent failure toward that end.
In multiple resolutions, the U.N. General Assembly
emphasized that states should allow and even facilitate foreign
humanitarian aid. The 1990 U.N. General Assembly Resolution
45/100 acknowledged territorial and political sovereignty, but
“[i]nvite[d] all States whose populations are in need of such
assistance to facilitate the work of these organizations in
implementing humanitarian assistance, in particular the supply of
food, medicines and health care, for which access to victims is
essential.”62 Soon after that, the U.N. Security Council (SC) issued
binding resolutions demanding humanitarian access in Iraq,
Bosnia, and Somalia. U.N. SC Resolution 688 (1991) “[i]nsist[ed]
that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian
organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq
and make available all necessary facilities for their operations.”63
U.N. SC Resolution 770 (1992), regarding Bosnia, “[d]emand[ed]
that unimpeded and continuous access to all camps, prisons and
detention centres be granted immediately to . . . relevant
humanitarian organizations and that all detainees therein receive
humane treatment, including adequate food, shelter and medical

61. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 242 (June 27). The ICJ relied on a definition of “humanitarian
assistance” provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) referring to
“assistance . . . to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its
purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being.” Id. The
Court also highlighted Congress’s legislative text limiting U.S. intervention going forward:
It could include “the provision of food, clothing, medicine, and other humanitarian
assistance, and it does not include the provision of weapons, weapons systems, ammunition,
or other equipment, vehicles, or material which can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or
death.” Id. ¶ 243.
62. G.A. Res. 45/100, ¶ 4 (Dec. 14, 1990) (“Humanitarian assistance to victims of
natural disasters and similar emergency situations.”).
63. S.C. Res. 688, ¶ 3 (Apr. 5, 1991).
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care“64 and “that all parties and others concerned take the necessary
measures to ensure the safety of . . . personnel engaged in the
delivery of humanitarian assistance.”65 U.N. SC Resolution 794
(1992) on Somalia demanded “that all parties, movements and
factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to facilitate the
efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and
humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian
assistance to the affected population in Somalia.”66 This resolution
actually went further: it expressly authorized the use of force to
ensure the safety of humanitarian aid personnel.67
In his 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace, U.N. Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali made a foundational argument for access for
the international community when there is a void created by a
state’s failure to carry out its responsibilities: the international
community should respect states’ territorial sovereignty, but states
should accept that when their internal governance has international
effects, at a certain point they will need to accept and facilitate an
international response. The report observed,
The foundation-stone of [peace] is and must remain the State.
Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any
common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive
sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by
reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to
find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the
requirements of an ever more interdependent world. . . .

....
In . . . situations of internal crisis the United Nations will need
to respect the sovereignty of the State; to do otherwise would not
be in accordance with the understanding of Member States in
accepting the principles of the Charter. The Organization must
remain mindful of the carefully negotiated balance of the guiding
principles . . . that humanitarian assistance must be provided in
accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and
impartiality; that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national
unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the

64.
65.
66.
67.
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Charter of the United Nations; and that, in this context,
humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of
the affected country and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal by
that country.68

Domestic governance affects international security. “Absolute
and exclusive sovereignty” was never actually absolute. States have
a responsibility to take care of “victims of emergencies occurring
on their territory,” and that responsibility includes asking for
humanitarian aid when needed or, at least, allowing humanitarian
aid providers access to people in need—and that aid would not be
a breach of sovereignty.69 This principle echoes both the 1856
French assertion to the Ottoman Empire regarding minority
religious rights and the 1986 ICJ Nicaragua v. United States opinion
that humanitarian aid does not violate sovereignty.70
The international community responded inadequately to
several domestic state failures in the 1990s, including Bosnia,
Somalia, and Rwanda, among others. Before the September 11,
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center, Robert Kaplan warned of
“The Coming Anarchy” the world would experience as a
consequence of failed states, using Sierra Leone as an example.71 At
the end of that decade, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave his
Two Sovereignties speech. Addressing the U.N. General Assembly in
1999, he sought to recognize a sovereignty of individuals, as well
as sovereignty of states, and a responsibility for states and the
international community to be responsive to it:
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined
by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. The
State is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, and
not vice versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty—and by this
I mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and every
individual as enshrined in our Charter—has been enhanced by a

68. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 58, ¶¶ 17, 30 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Boutros-Ghali thus effectively called back to the pre–League of Nations era—
within limits. He also suggested that the world should not re-create the French revolutionary
wars: “The United Nations has not closed its door. Yet if every ethnic, religious or linguistic
group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and
economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve.” Id. ¶ 17.
71. Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC (Feb. 1994),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/.
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renewed consciousness of the right of every individual to control
his or her own destiny.
....
Nothing in the Charter precludes a recognition that there are
rights beyond borders. Indeed, its very letter and spirit are the
affirmation of those fundamental human rights. In short, it is not
the deficiencies of the Charter which have brought us to this
juncture, but our difficulties in applying its principles to a new
era; an era when strictly traditional notions of sovereignty can no
longer do justice to the aspirations of peoples everywhere to attain
their fundamental freedoms.72

By this point, it should be clear that nothing in his speech was
new: Secretary-General Annan was referring to the responsibilities
of a state to its people. He described the now-axiomatic concept that
a state’s legitimacy should come from popular sovereignty—the
consent of the governed—and that the state must respect and even
cultivate the individual liberties of the governed in order to obtain
their consent.
In the United States, the final National Security Strategy of the
Clinton administration highlighted failed states, observing,
At times in the new century, we can expect that, despite
international prevention efforts, some states will be unable to
provide basic governance, safety and security, and opportunities
for their populations, potentially generating internal conflict,
mass migration, famine, epidemic diseases, environmental
disasters, mass killings and aggression against neighboring states
or ethnic groups – events which can threaten regional security and
U.S. interests.73

Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, had campaigned on a
non-interventionist foreign policy platform but would also
recognize the security threat posed by failed states in the wake of
the 9/11 attacks. His first national security strategy flatly stated,

72. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Presents
His Annual Report to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136/GA/9596
(Sept. 20, 1999) (emphasis added).
73. WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY 2 (1999),
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/media/pdf/nssr-1299.pdf.
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“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are
by failing ones.”74
The actual longstanding global consensus had returned:
absolute territorial sovereignty for domestically unstable states
posed too much of a risk to international security.
b. Defining the “responsibility to protect.” In December 2001 (after
years of work that pre-dated 9/11, made all the more urgent by it),
the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS), a working group tasked by the U.N. Secretary
General, published their report formally introducing the term, “the
responsibility to protect.”75 It further emphasized the renewed
international consensus that state legitimacy must be based on
popular sovereignty, which creates certain responsibilities for the
state toward its people, asserting:
The defense of state sovereignty, by even its strongest supporters,
does not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do
what it wants to its own people. . . . It is acknowledged that
sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally—to respect
the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the
dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state. In
international human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state
practice itself, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this
dual responsibility. Sovereignty as responsibility has become the
minimum content of good international citizenship.
This modern understanding of the meaning of sovereignty is of
central importance in the Commission’s approach to the question
of intervention for human protection purposes, and in particular
in the development of our core theme, “the responsibility to
protect” . . . .76

As much as the ensuing discourse on “responsibility to protect”
(R2P) has focused on security, it bears noting that the original
definition in the ICISS report is expansive. In popular sovereignty,
the people give legitimacy to the state, and the state in turn
provides security—it protects their liberty. As defined by the ICISS,

74. WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1 (2002), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
75. COMM’N ON INTERVENTION, supra note 4.
76. Id. ¶¶ 1.35, 1.36.
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liberty is more than just physical security: “Human security
means the security of people—their physical safety, their
economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth
as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and
fundamental freedoms.”77
R2P also reframes sovereignty78 from a question of foreign
intervention into one of domestic legitimacy; rather than negating
potential international action, it demands affirmative domestic
action. The ICISS report concluded,
[T]he debate about intervention for human protection purposes
should focus not on “the right to intervene” but on “the
responsibility to protect.” The proposed change in terminology is
also a change in perspective, reversing the perceptions inherent in
the traditional language, and adding some additional ones:
First, the responsibility to protect implies an evaluation
of the issues from the point of view of those seeking or
needing support, rather than those who may be
considering intervention. . . .
Secondly, the responsibility to protect acknowledges that the
primary responsibility in this regard rests with the state
concerned, and that it is only if the state is unable or unwilling
to fulfill this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, that it
becomes the responsibility of the international community to
act in its place. . . .79

This acknowledgment of an internal responsibility was
significant. It shifted sovereignty from a myopic focus on foreign
intervention to a comprehensive survey of human, national, and
international security. It described a new criterion for state conduct
for potential international enforcement, using any means available
in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (including use of force).
c. Invoking the “responsibility to protect.” Ten years after the U.N.
created the R2P concept, the U.N. Security Council agreed to invoke
it for the first time in Libya in 2011. Observing the Libyan
government’s violent response to a popular revolution, the U.N.
Security Council was careful not to intervene to support efforts to
77. Id. ¶ 2.21.
78. Id. ¶ 2.15.
79. Id. ¶¶ 2.21, 2.29.

1052

3.KHARDORI_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

1053

3/28/2021 1:00 AM

What Does the State Owe to Its People?

overthrow the government, but it did authorize the use of
force to protect the civilian population from state violence.
U.N. SC Resolution 1973 outlined the Security Council’s
main considerations:
Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the
Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts
bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure
the protection of civilians . . .
[And e]xpressing its determination to ensure the protection of
civilians . . . [a]nd unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance
and the safety of humanitarian personnel . . . .80
The resolution authorized Member States “[t]o take all necessary
measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas
under threat of attack.”81

The practical results of the authorized limited intervention in
Libya were mixed. When the prospect came up again in the Syrian
conflict, ongoing since 2011, efforts to invoke R2P were muted. This
was partly due to opposition by Russia and China, who vetoed no
fewer than twelve U.N. Security Council resolutions between 2011
and 2019.82 But there was reticence in U.S. foreign policy circles, too.
Just as with the League of Nations and the International Relief
Union, members of the Senate did not want any precedent
compelling intervention; they wanted to maintain discretion to
exercise the foreign policy option.83 The ICISS report itself, though,
had already addressed this concern by framing R2P as a binding
responsibility on a state for its own internal affairs, potentially
justifying a determination of a “right to intervene”—not a
responsibility of the international community. Still, the ultimate
takeaway is that R2P can be invoked. In the case of Libya, the

80. S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (emphasis added).
81. Id. ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
82. Yasmine Nahlawi, Overcoming Russian and Chinese Vetoes on Syria Through Uniting
for Peace, 24 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 111, 123 (2019).
83. Mark Landler, U.S. Urged to Adopt Policy Justifying Intervention, N.Y. TIMES
(July 23, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/24/us/politics/us-urged-to-adoptpolicy-justifying-intervention.html (“To some critics, particularly on the right, R2P smacks
of a multilateral approach to foreign policy that encroaches on American sovereignty. An
aide to [Senator] Corker, for example, said he wanted to make sure that . . . the United States
should only decide to act militarily based on its own national interests.”).
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international community showed it can choose to hold a country to
this standard.
Besides U.N. Security Council deliberations, there has been at
least one other binding statement of concrete actions a state must
take as part of its R2P regarding its own people: a regional
agreement, the African Union’s 2009 Convention for the Protection
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala
Convention).84 In multiple places, the agreement binds African
Union countries to facilitate humanitarian assistance within their
own borders and even requires them to request it. Article III(1)(j)
binds State Parties to “[e]nsure assistance to internally displaced
persons by meeting their basic needs as well as allowing and
facilitating rapid and unimpeded access by humanitarian
organizations and personnel.”85 Article V(6) calls on state parties to
request humanitarian aid where their own “available resources are
inadequate.”86 As of 2019, 30 of the 50 Member States of the African
Union are party to the convention.87 An International Committee of
the Red Cross ten-year review of the status of implementation
reports that several state parties have passed domestic legislation
and engaged in sub-regional and peer-to-peer exchanges, and all of
the parties jointly agreed to the Harare Plan of Action for the
Implementation of the Kampala Convention in 2017 and produced
a model law for domestic implementation in 2018.88 This regional
agreement shows a way to use domestic commitments to increase
international engagement.
States have a responsibility to respect and protect the liberty of
their people, who in turn can confer legitimacy, and the
international community has an interest in that state’s fulfillment
of its responsibilities as a matter of international security. The
history of sovereignty shows this has always been the norm.

84. Kampala Convention: African Union Convention for the Protection
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, adopted Oct. 23, 2009
(entered into force Dec. 6, 2012), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36846-treatykampala_convention.pdf.
85. Id. art. III(1)(j).
86. Id. art. V(6).
87. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE KAMPALA CONVENTION: KEY
RECOMMENDATIONS TEN YEARS ON 5 (Dec. 2019), https://shop.icrc.org/the-kampalaconvention-key-recommendations-ten-years-on-pdf-en.
88. Id. at 12, 19, 33.
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Through the multilateral framework, the international community
has formally acknowledged this, even if it has not codified it yet.
III. DEVELOPMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
STATE RESPONSIBILITIES
Accepting that state legitimacy comes from popular
sovereignty, and thus should reflect the general will of the people,
the first necessary condition for a legitimate state is the free will of
individuals. It is a feedback loop. A state is legitimized by the
consent of the governed; in order to give that consent, the governed
must be able to exercise free will. Their ability to develop that free
will depends on the circumstances that surround them, including
the security and services provided by the state.
The concept of “development” itself has evolved over time.
Early on, it was a civilizational project, then a state project,
and now since the 1945 U.N. Charter, increasingly a human rights
concept, with implications for the responsibilities of states to their
own people and to other states. The consistent through line has
been its focus on cultivation of the individual. U.N. declarations
and covenants point toward a global consensus on the constituent
parts of that cultivation: they include civil, political, economic,
social, and cultural rights. There is no consensus on what parts—
or to what extent—the state and the international community are
responsible for.
The history of the “development” endeavor indicates that
it is best understood as a human right for which the state is
necessarily responsible. The state is responsible to its people to help
ensure and cultivate their exercise of free will, and it is responsible
to the international community as part of its responsibility
to protect. To the extent there is a human “right to development”
and a “responsibility to protect,” there is a state “responsibility
to develop.”
A. Liberty: Cultivating and Exercising Individual Free Will
It is not a coincidence that the first proponents of development
and leaders of the anti-slavery movement were religious
missionaries. The anti-slavery movement is often referred to as the
first human rights campaign, but the history of state sovereignty
1055
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shows a cause that predates it: freedom of thought in service of
religion itself.
For all of the innovations of the Enlightenment era, including
the Westphalian state and popular sovereignty, the idea of
individual free will was a longstanding necessary prerequisite.
Around AD 395, St. Augustine asserted in his treatise On the Free
Choice of the Will that man has free will, and thus has the personal
responsibility to choose between good and evil. He wrote,
If a person is something good and could act rightly only
because he willed to, then he ought to have free will, without
which he could not act rightly. We should not believe that,
because a person also sins through it, God gave it to him for this
purpose. The fact that a person cannot live rightly without it
is therefore a sufficient reason why it should have been given
to him.
Free will can also be understood to be given for this reason:
If anyone uses it in order to sin, the divinity redresses him [for it].
This would happen unjustly if free will had been given not only
for living rightly but also for sinning. How would God justly
redress someone who made use of his will for the purpose for
which it was given?89

This responsibility to choose to be good—to choose and follow
a religion as a matter of free will—informs the liberty of conscience
that the Treaty of Westphalia provided in 1648. The direct
connection was acknowledged by Enlightenment-era thinkers.
Hegel, for example, observed,
It was first the Germanic peoples, through Christianity, who
came to the awareness that every human is free by virtue of being
human, and that the freedom of spirit comprises our most human
nature. This awareness arose first in religion, in the innermost
region of Spirit. But to introduce this principle into worldly reality
as well: that was a further task, requiring long effort and
civilization to bring it into being . . . .
This application of the principle of freedom to worldly
reality—the dissemination of this principle so that it permeates

89. AUGUSTINE, ON THE FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL, ON GRACE AND FREE CHOICE, AND
OTHER WRITINGS 31 (Peter King ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2010),
https://philonew.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/augustine-augustine-on-the-free-choiceof-the-will-on-grace-and-free-choice-and-other-writings-2010.pdf.
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the worldly situation—this is the long process that makes up
history itself.90

Development was a civilization-level collaboration among
individuals to help each of them increase their ability to exercise
their own free will. In his history of the term “civilization,” Brett
Bowden summarized Hegel’s logic well:
In order to comprehend Hegel’s “Idea of Freedom” and its
realization in and through the state, it is necessary to have a
general understanding of his theory of the state, for they go handin-hand. . . . For Hegel, a person is free only to the extent that she
or he is a rational self-determining individual with the ability to
think and apply the powers of reason. As mere individuals,
however, human beings are incapable of ever being truly free or
fulfilling their rationality without the rational state. For it is only
in the state that true freedom can be actualized, whereby “right
and duty coalesce, and by being in the ethical order a man has
rights in so far as he has duties, and duties in so far as he
has rights.”91

The purpose of a state, as Hegel conceptualizes it, is to facilitate
the realization of individual freedom, which in turn legitimizes the
state: individuals exercising their individual liberty cooperate to
create the general will of the people, which can confer popular
sovereignty on the state. A state that does not have individuals
exercising their freedom to consent to their government, then,
has no legitimate sovereignty. This rationale helped justify
colonial empire—the mission of “civilizing” peoples outside of
their countries’ borders while acting as trustees over those
foreign territories.
It also informed evangelical missionaries like William Carey.
He advocated for education and institution-building around the
world to help potential converts comprehend and choose to accept
their religious preaching. His 1792 Enquiry into the Obligations of
Christians to Use Means for the Conversion of the Heathens was of its
time in its tone and description of non-Europeans, but it advocated

90. G.W.F. HEGEL, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 21 (Leo Rauch
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1988) (1840).
91. BRETT BOWDEN, THE EMPIRE OF CIVILIZATION: THE EVOLUTION OF AN IMPERIAL
IDEA 68–69 (2009) (quoting G.W.F HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 109 (1820)).
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against slavery and encouraged evangelical outreach as a
“civilizing” mission. He wrote,
After all, the uncivilized state of the heathen, instead of
affording an objection against preaching the gospel to them, ought
to furnish an argument for it. Can we as men, or as [C]hristians,
hear that a great part of our fellow creatures, whose souls are as
immortal as ours, and who are as capable as ourselves, of
adorning the gospel, and contributing by their preaching,
writings, or practices to the glory of our Redeemer’s name, and
the good of his church, are [e]nveloped in ignorance and
barbarism? Can we hear that they are without the gospel, without
government, without laws, and without arts, and sciences; and
not exert ourselves to introduce amongst them the sentiments of
men, and of Christians? Would not the spread of the gospel be the
most effectual mean of their civilization? Would not that make
them useful members of society?92

This view that the role of government is to facilitate the
individual liberty was also fundamental to the abolition of slavery;
it was antithetical to an idea of a state that enforces human
bondage. Hence, in a landmark decision for the global anti-slavery
campaign, a British court declined to enforce ownership rights of
an American slaveowner who visited with his slave, James
Somerset, in 1772. (The decision applied only to British territory; it
did not apply to any of its colonies.) The Court held that, absent any
“positive law” expressly authorizing slavery, the natural law
respecting individual liberty in England could not enforce slavery:
So high an act of dominion must be recognized by the law of the
country where [slavery] is used. The power of a master over his
slave has been extremely different, in different countries. The state
of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being
introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but only positive
law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and
time itself from whence it was created, is erased from memory:
it’s so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it but
positive law. Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow
from a decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by

92. WILLIAM CAREY, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE OBLIGATIONS OF CHRISTIANS TO USE MEANS
CONVERSION OF THE HEATHENS 69–70 (1792), https://www.wmcarey.edu/carey/
enquiry/anenquiry.pdf; see also MICHAEL BARNETT, EMPIRE OF HUMANITY: A HISTORY OF
HUMANITARIANISM 64 (2011).
FOR THE
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the law of England; and therefore the black [sic] must
be discharged.93

The fundamental role—the responsibility—of a legitimate state,
in this conception, was to facilitate and secure individual liberty. In
other words, the decision framed development as freedom: a
longstanding foundation of the concept, as Amartya Sen put it 1,600
years after St. Augustine.94
B. Evolving Expectations of the State at Home: Social Services and
Safety Nets
1. Framing expectations of the state
As the Enlightenment era transitioned to the Industrial
Revolution and individuals became factors of economic
production, public thinkers, bureaucrats, tradespeople, and factory
workers began to raise the question of the state’s role in insuring
against poverty and other widespread, common constraints on
individual liberty. They articulated that role as what are now
referred to as social rights.
In 1776, the same year the United States declared independence,
Adam Smith made the economic and political argument that, in
addition to security and safety, the state has an interest in providing
public infrastructure and public education—and even favorably
mentioned public health in the process. Though invariably
associated with the idea of the “invisible hand,” whereby
individual creativity and an unfettered free market will drive
economic growth, he actually also advocated for a role for the state
in cultivating its citizens to help improve economic productivity
and to promote good governance and legitimate government. He
wrote in his treatise, The Wealth of Nations:
For a very small expense the public can facilitate, can encourage,
and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people
the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of
education . . . .

....

93. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B. 1772); see also JENNY S. MARTINEZ,
THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 20 (2012).
94. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
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[T]o prevent [ignorance] . . . from spreading . . . through the great
body of the people, would still deserve the most serious attention
of government, in the same manner as it would deserve its most
serious attention to prevent a leprosy or any other loathsome and
offensive disease . . . from spreading itself among them . . . .
A man without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a
man . . . seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more
essential part of the character of human nature . . . .
The state, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from
their instruction. The more they are instructed the less liable they
are to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition, which,
among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful
disorders. An instructed and intelligent people, besides, are
always more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid
one . . . . They are more disposed to examine, and more capable of
seeing through, the interested complaints of faction and sedition,
and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any
wanton or unnecessary opposition to the measures of
government. In free countries, where the safety of government
depends very much upon the favourable judgment which the
people may form of its conduct, it must surely be of the highest
importance that they should not be disposed to judge rashly or
capriciously concerning it.95

So, the state has an interest in providing at least a certain level
of education to help make better informed, more reasonable, more
productive citizens.
Similarly, Thomas Paine, author of the influential pamphlet
Common Sense, which advocated for American independence from
Britain in 1776, also described the rights of man that should be
expected in a state whose government is based on popular
sovereignty. In his 1791 essay, Rights of Man, he defended the
French Revolution as an action by the people to legitimize their
government96 and advocated for more political rights (voting
rights) for more citizens (beyond landowners) to help entrench
legitimate government.97 Paine asserted that the social compact
between the state and the people in a democratically legitimate
95. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 1044, 1048–49 (Elec. Book Co. 2001) (1776).
96. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN: BEING AN ANSWER TO MR. BURKE’S ATTACK
ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (Floating Press 2010) (1791).
97. Id. at 85–86.
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government is an ongoing negotiation based on protection
and cultivation of certain rights.98 Echoing the Enlightenment era
consensus that “man” has a natural right to liberty, he asserted
that the only reason people would enter into a social compact and
consent to be governed as a group is to secure and cultivate
that liberty:
Man did not enter into society to become worse than he was
before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have
those rights better secured. His natural rights are the foundation
of all his civil rights . . . .
Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his
existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of
the mind [(including freedom of thought, which includes freedom
of religion)], and also all those rights of acting as an individual for
his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the
natural rights of others. Civil rights are those which appertain to
man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has
for its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the
individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is
not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those
which relate to security and protection. 99

Accordingly, Paine concludes, the state has affirmative duties
to the people in service of their liberty:
Whatever the form or constitution of government may be, it
ought to have no other object than the general happiness. When,
instead of this, it operates to create and increase wretchedness in
any of the parts of society, it is on a wrong system . . . .

....
When, in countries that are called civili[z]ed, we see age going to
the workhouse and youth to the gallows, something must be
98. Id. at 34, 37. On the constant negotiation of government, he wrote particularly
colorfully, “A greater absurdity cannot present itself to the understanding of man . . . [to say]
that a certain body of men who existed a hundred years ago made a law, and that there does
not exist in the nation, nor ever will, nor ever can, a power to alter it . . . . The [British]
Parliament of 1688 might as well have passed an act to have authorized themselves to live
for ever [sic], as to make their authority live for ever [sic]. All, therefore, that can be said of
those clauses is that they are a formality of words, of as much import as if those who used
them had addressed a congratulation to themselves, and in the oriental style of antiquity had
said: O Parliament, live for ever [sic]!” Id.
99. Id. at 75–76.
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wrong in the system of government. . . . [T]here lies hidden from
the eye of common observation, a mass of wretchedness, that has
scarcely any other chance, than to expire in poverty or infamy. Its
entrance into life is marked with the presage of its fate; and until
this is remedied, it is in vain to punish.
Civil government does not exist in executions; but in making
such provision for the instruction of youth and the support of age,
as to exclude, as much as possible, profligacy from the one and
despair from the other.100

From this, he outlined several social protections a state should
be expected to provide, including anti-poverty protections, like old
age and disability pensions; economic rights, including freedom of
labor (e.g., to negotiate fair compensation); and political rights and
social services necessary for them, including universal suffrage and
public education. On the importance of the link between education
and political rights and state legitimacy, he emphasized, “A nation
under a well-regulated government should permit none to remain
uninstructed. It is monarchical and aristocratical government only
that requires ignorance for its support.”101
For reasons similar to those cited by Smith and Paine, Thomas
Jefferson advocated for public education of citizens in America,
sponsoring multiple bills in his home state, Virginia, including the
1779 Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge and the 1817
Bill for Establishing a System of Public Education. He described
America’s new republican form of government as “a government
by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally according to
rules established by the majority,” and he described education of
the citizens as necessary to “facilitate the people’s ‘good sense’ on
which ‘we may rely with the most security for the preservation of
a due degree of liberty.’”102
So, even at the foundation of the modern liberal state, the
thinkers and framers who shaped it understood that the state has
responsibilities to provide certain services to facilitate the exercise
of individual liberty.

100. Id. at 305, 316–17.
101. Id. at 356.
102. James Carpenter, Thomas Jefferson and the Ideology of Democratic Schooling,
21 DEMOCRACY & EDUC. 1, 3 (2013) (quoting XV THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 19, 918
(A.A. Lipscomb & A.E. Bergh eds., 1903)).
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2. Implementing expectations of the state
The Industrial Revolution over the first half of the 1800s
changed social and economic relationships among people and
between people and the state.103 As more people combined their
labor and cities grew around factories, and economic growth in the
state came to rely on “labor” as an economic and social class, states
and the people increasingly recognized a role for the state in
providing certain social goods or benefits to ensure their general
well-being. To be clear, this was a very minimal level of “wellbeing”; it is more accurate to describe the social protections of the
era as safety nets against abject destitution. Still, it established the
concept of social rights.104
The elements of social rights and economic protections rose in
Europe, the United States, and throughout the world pursuant to
industrialization and the creation of non-partisan administrative
state bureaucracies that were perceived by the public as capable of
administering social benefits without political or personal bias.105
States began to provide these services and protections for multiple
reasons, including domestic stability (responding to or preempting
unrest from laborers, a growing social class), recognizing
healthy labor as needed economic inputs, and as a political
consequence of the evolving social compact.106 As Stein Kuhnle and
Anne Sander summarized,
The experience of industrialization sustainably altered the
debate on the nature of social contingency and perceptions of
poverty. Old age or sickness had of course been perceived as a
threat to the well-being of individuals from time immemorial.
Now, however, a new-found understanding of unemployment
and of the operation of the business cycle made for a rethinking
103. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 77 (Beacon Press 1957) (1944).
104. Technically, state acts of welfare could be traced back to the British Elizabethan
Act for the Relief of the Poor in 1601 and similar state acts through the Prussian Landrecht of
1794, but these were acts of charity of a monarch that supported local initiatives. See Stein
Kuhnle & Anne Sander, The Emergence of the Western Welfare State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF THE WELFARE STATE 61, 62–63 (Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert
Obinger & Christopher Pierson eds., 2010).
105. See Ann Shola Orloff & Theda Skocpol, Why Not Equal Protection? Explaining the
Politics of Public Social Spending in Britain, 1900–1911, and the United States, 1880s–1920, 49 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 726, 726–50, 740–42 (1984).
106. Kuhnle & Sander, supra note 104, at 64–65.
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of the whole notion of welfare, with the focus changing to
provisions that addressed the most significant social deficits with
the most evident social consequences. The evolving ‘social
question’ accompanying industrialization served as an important
spur for the crystallization of the notion of social rights, as
workers started to perceive themselves as one class and as the
labor movement gained increasing importance. Focusing on the
question of how economic progress could be secured in face of the
political and moral threat imposed by the condition of the
working class, the solution was increasingly seen as some kind of
state action. Prior decades had seen the spread of democracy and
political rights. Directly or indirectly, these now smoothed the
way for social rights.107

The nineteenth century saw a wide range of domestic social
legislation, including social insurance, as well as labor standards
and protections, public health, and public health measures.108 The
British Factory Act of 1802 limited workday hours to some extent
and required factory owners to provide a minimal level of literacy
to “apprentices” (i.e., child laborers), which was progress for its
time. In 1834, Britain’s first “New Poor Law” recognized a state
responsibility to provide a very minimal economic safety net, a sort
of limited economic security.109 Notably, just three years following
that acknowledgment, Britain provided famine relief to its colonial
subjects in India for the first time—extending the logic of this first
acknowledgment of an economic responsibility to the people under
the state’s dominion.110 From the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution through the end of World War I in 1918, thirty-two
countries in the world had established some sort of social insurance
or compensation benefit for workplace injuries, eighteen countries
had some form of public healthcare benefit or insurance, and
thirteen had old-age disability or survivor’s benefits.111
The United States lagged behind most Western states in
providing what are now considered social rights. Scholars Theda
Skocpol and Ann Orloff attribute this to the United States being
relatively late to establish a non-partisan civil service that could be
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
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Id. at 64–65.
BARNETT, supra note 92, at 63.
Id.
Kuhnle & Stander, supra note 104, at 69–70.
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trusted to administer social services fairly.112 Until the Civil Service
Act of 1883, the U.S. federal bureaucracy was staffed under a
“spoils” system, whereby most positions were filled by appointees
of each new President, and they invariably favored short-term
patronage over long-term benefits.113 In the United States, race was
apparently less of a domestic factor in delaying a general benefit
than it would be on the international level (see discussions herein
on the League of Nations and U.N. human rights negotiations)
because, whatever benefits were provided domestically (dating
back to Civil War pensions) could—and did—simply exclude
non-white people until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited
such distinctions.114
Overall, worldwide social insurance and social security policies
were an evolutionary step forward for the state. Security and
stability of the state became more than just questions of foreign
intrusion and domestic violence; it now recognized human
security, which itself expanded beyond the merely physical to
include economic and social aspects.115 Not coincidentally, this
rationale would be echoed another century later in the 1990s
discussions on failed states and responsibility to protect.
C. Expanding Statehood: Trusteeship Abroad
1. Defining “civilization”
While negotiating domestic responsibilities of a state, the
European Great Powers were able to dictate expectations for
peoples and potential states abroad in their colonies. Speaking from
his experience as a British colonial officer in India, J.S. Mill wrote in
his 1836 essay, Civilization, that the term “is a word of double
meaning . . . [including] human improvement in general, and
sometimes . . . certain kinds of improvement in particular.”116 He
further described the “ingredients of civilization”:

112. See Orloff & Skocpol, supra note 105, at 739.
113. See id. at 731; U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEAL: A HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 9 (2012).
114. See Orloff & Skocpol, supra note 105, at 729.
115. Kuhnle & Stander, supra note 104, at 64.
116. JOHN STUART MILL, CIVILIZATION, reprinted in ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND CULTURE 51
(Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Doubleday 1962) (1836) (emphasis in original).
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[A] savage tribe consists of a handful of individuals, wandering
or thinly scattered over a vast tract of country: a dense population,
therefore, dwelling in fixed habitations, and largely collected
together in towns and villages, we term civilized. In savage life
there is no commerce, no manufacture, no agriculture, or next to
none; a country in the fruits of agriculture, commerce, and
manufactures, we call civilized. In savage communities each
person shifts for himself; except in war (and even then very
imperfectly) we seldom see any joint operations carried on by the
union of many; nor do savages find much pleasure in each other’s
society. Wherever, therefore, we find human beings acting
together for common purposes in large bodies, and enjoying the
pleasures of social intercourse, we term them civilized.117

Many Enlightenment-era thinkers articulated individual
freedom as a purpose of the state. Some also rationalized that
individual freedom must be expanded to all states as a matter of
international security: truly democratic states would be highly
disinclined to go to war with each other. Bowden summarizes
Immanuel Kant on this point: Kant’s Idea for a Universal History
described the individual’s “highest purpose of Nature” as
“realizable only in a ‘society with the greatest freedom’ under a
‘perfectly just civic constitution’”—the individual needs the
institutions of the state, administered objectively, to help them most
fully realize their individual freedom. 118 In turn, in such an idealtype state with a representative government, the represented
individuals would be unlikely to exercise their free will to commit
themselves to war. Per Bowden, Kant
affirms that the “republican constitution, besides the purity of its
origin . . . also gives a favorable prospect for the desired
consequence, i.e., perpetual peace.” The “reason is this: if the
consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war
should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the
case), nothing is more natural than that they would be very

117. Id. at 52.
118. BOWDEN, supra note 91, at 84–85 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL
HISTORY FROM A COSMOPOLITAN POINT OF VIEW, reprinted in KANT: ON HISTORY 11, 16 (Lewis
White Beck ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1963) (1784); PERPETUAL PEACE, reprinted in KANT: ON HISTORY
85, 93–95 (1798)).
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cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing themselves
all the calamities of war.119

The consent of free, “civilized” citizens to their government
helps to ensure domestic stability of the state. States beholden to
that consent help ensure international security. Hence, national
interest becomes a basis for exporting the elements for Westphalian
governance—including as a justification for colonialism (framed
independently of the more prosaic economic extraction motive).
The 1885 Berlin Conference among European powers settled the
“scramble for Africa,” dividing African territories for their respective
colonial control. The Treaty of Berlin (also referred to as the General
Act) outlined a trustee-type relationship. Article 6 stated,
All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the
aforesaid territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation
of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of
their moral and material well-being, and to help in suppressing
slavery, and especially the slave trade. They shall, without
distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religious,
scientific or charitable institutions and undertakings created and
organized for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the
natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.120

They implicitly acknowledged that they did not have
legitimacy in the form of consent of the governed, but they justified
their dominion by rationalizing that the people lacked the ability to
provide that consent. Their relationship was paternalistic; they
created and took on a state responsibility to develop the territory
and people to “bring[] home to them the blessings of
civilization.”121 This, as Rudyard Kipling infamously described
in advocating for the United States to provide development
assistance to the Philippines after gaining control over it in the
Spanish-American War in 1898, was “the white man’s burden.”122
The emerging consensus standard of civilization among
European states and thinkers was a state that represents the will of

119. Id.
120. General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa art. 6, Feb. 26, 1885
(emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. Rudyard Kipling, The White Man’s Burden: The United States and The Philippine
Islands, MCCLURE’S MAG., Feb. 1899, at 12.
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the people of its territory in international relations externally and
protects the private life, liberty, and property of individuals
regardless of nationality internally.123
That standard is still very relevant today; it informs the
international community’s general end-goal for a “developing”
country: a government whose legitimacy is based on popular
sovereignty (which implicates civil and political rights), exercised
without bias (rule of law and civil rights), and committed to
protecting property (economic rights) and respecting—and
necessarily cultivating—liberty (social and cultural rights—e.g.,
especially, religion).
2. Acknowledging self-determination . . . at some indeterminate
future point
After Berlin, the next international agreement to address
colonies was more specific: the Charter of the League of Nations in
1919 established the Mandates system in the wake of World War I,
reframing colonial rule as a transitional authority. Article 22 of the
Charter stated,
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of
the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by
peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the
principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a
sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of
this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the
tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by
reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position
can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it,
and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories
on behalf of the League.124

The “well-being and development” of the people became a
“sacred trust” of the occupying authority.125 It also begged the
question: Would that not also be the case for a legitimate
123. BOWDEN, supra note 91, at 123.
124. League of Nations Covenant art. 22 (emphasis added).
125. Id.
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government? Article 23 laid out the elements of this governing
stewardship, including responsibilities to
endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions
of labor . . . ;
undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants . . . ;
make provision to secure and maintain freedom of
communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the
commerce of all Members of the League[; and]
endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern for the
prevention and control of disease.126

The affected former colonial territories were divided into three
classes within the League’s Mandate system, based on perceptions
of their level of “civilization” or “development.”127 From Class A,
the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon included terms such as
Article 1, directing the governing Mandatory to “facilitate the
progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent
States”; Article 6 to “establish . . . a judicial system which shall
assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of
their rights”; and Article 8 guaranteeing “the free exercise of all
forms of worship” and “encourag[ing] public instruction.”128 Class
A and Class B mandates also included clauses on the security of all
people and property (for nationals of any member of the League)
and free trade. From Class C, Australia’s mandate in New Guinea
did not mention improvement of “the natives,” but Section 15
did outlaw slavery and commit to “free exercise of all forms
of worship.”129
At the outset of the negotiations for the Charter, U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson asserted an ideal of universal self-determination
in his “Fourteen Points” speech:
What we demand . . . is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the
world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be

126. Id. art. 23.
127. Denys P. Myers, The Mandate System of the League of Nations, 96 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 74 (1921).
128. COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, 3
LEAGUE NATIONS OFF. J. 1013, 1013–14 (1922).
129. New Guinea Act 1920 (Cth) (Austl.) (codifying terms of the Australian Mandate for
New Guinea).
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made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own,
wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be
assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the
world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of
the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own
part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will
not be done to us.130

The Charter itself was significantly less emphatic. Indeed, a
Japanese proposal to include a statement on racial equality in the
Charter was rejected due to concerns of the American and Great
Powers representatives over implications for their domestic
governance.131 But it did contemplate self-determination for the
Class A Mandates, describing “the rendering of administrative
advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are
able to stand alone.”132 The trustee governments were expected to
provide basic state administration, including labor and commerce
regulation and infrastructure, and fair administration of justice.
Though the United States ultimately did not ratify the Charter, it
had taken on for itself similar responsibilities in the territories it had
gained control of in the Spanish-American War of 1898. It also
provided public health interventions, with sanitation and yellow

130. Woodrow Wilson, President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, AVALON PROJECT
(Jan. 8, 1918), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp. In response to the
advocacy for self-determination, W.E.B. Du Bois and other leaders of the NAACP traveled
to the Paris negotiations in hopes of petitioning for self-determination for black people. The
group deliberately mirrored the fourteen-point speech in presenting a nine-point
declaration. Point 8 used the “civilization” rhetoric, as well: “Civilized Negroes: Wherever
persons of African descent are civilized and able to meet the tests of surrounding culture,
they shall be accorded the same rights as their fellow citizens; they shall not be denied on
account of race or color a voice in their own government, justice before the courts and
economic and social equality according to ability and desert.” See Arnulf Becker Lorca,
Petitioning the International: A ‘Pre-history’ of Self-determination, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 497, 500
(2014). Their petition was not successful, and the final Charter took a more limited approach
to self-determination. Id.
131. Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950, 47 HIST. J. 379,
382 (2004) (“A Japanese proposal that the League commit itself to racial equality was
unceremoniously and improperly blocked by the major Powers, despite the support it had
attracted from other states. . . . So far as Whitehall [(a colloquialism for the British
government)] was concerned, the League was not going to be allowed to pontificate about
racial segregation in the USA, nor about the English treatment of Catholics or Chinese in
Liverpool.”); Seth Mohney, The Great Power Origins of Human Rights, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 827,
833 (2014).
132. League of Nations Covenant art. 22.
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fever eradication campaigns in the Philippines and Cuba, which
benefited American security and economic interests.133
D. The United Nations Charter: Transition to Human
Rights-Based Obligations
1. Post-war: The New Deal at home and abroad
During World War II, U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
contended with domestic responsibilities of the state at home,
which influenced his proposals that significantly shaped the United
Nations Charter in 1945 and the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights
in 1948.
Having become president in the midst of the Great Depression,
Roosevelt initially focused on establishing economic and social
safety nets at home. He worked with Congress to pass the Social
Security Act of 1935. As a bill, it also briefly mentioned health, but
according to an authoritative account, it was “struck out . . . because
of objections by Southern political leaders that the federal
government might use such phrases to force their states to pay
higher pensions to blacks than they thought desirable.”134 Still, it
established America’s minimal social safety net. Roosevelt’s 1941
State of the Union address, which became known as the Four
Freedoms speech, identified domestic economic and social conditions
as causes of state instability and, consequently, threats to
international security, and proposed state intervention accordingly:
Certainly this is no time for any of us to stop thinking about
the social and economic problems which are the root cause of the social
revolution which is today a supreme factor in the world. For there is
nothing mysterious about the foundations of a healthy and strong
democracy. The basic things expected by our people of their political
and economic systems are simple. They are: Equality of opportunity
for youth and for others. Jobs for those who can work. Security for
those who need it. The ending of special privilege for the few. The
preservation of civil liberties for all. The enjoyment of the fruits of
scientific progress in a wider and constantly rising standard
of living.

133. See RANDALL M. PACKARD, A HISTORY OF GLOBAL HEALTH: INTERVENTIONS INTO
17–19, 28–31 (2016).
134. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 269 (2017).
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....
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look
forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.
The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in
the world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his
own way—everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want—which, translated into
world terms, means economic understandings which will secure
to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—
everywhere in the world.135

In 1945, he would further propose a “Second Bill of Rights” to
guarantee economic rights within the United States. He framed it
as a matter of individual liberty:
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true
individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and
independence. . . . In our day these economic truths have become
accepted as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second
Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity
can be established for all—regardless of station, race, or creed.136

He listed nine specific rights in the speech, including a right to
employment, a right to a living wage (“enough to provide adequate
food and clothing and recreation”) adequate medical care “and the
opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health,” social security
(“adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness,
accident, and unemployment”), and education.137 These did not
become binding domestic U.S. rights—arguably for uniquely

135. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Transcript of President Franklin Roosevelt’s Annual
Message (Four Freedoms) to Congress (1941), OUR DOCUMENTS (emphasis added),
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=70&page=transcript
(last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
136. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to Congress, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (Jan. 11, 1944), http://www.fdrlibrary.
marist.edu/archives/address_text.html. For further discussion on Roosevelt’s speech,
see Cass R. Sunstein & Randy E. Barnett, Constitutive Commitments and Roosevelt’s Second Bill
of Rights: A Dialogue, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 205, 207 (2005).
137. Roosevelt, supra note 136.
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domestic U.S. reasons138—but they greatly influenced human rights
commitments elsewhere.
And he was not alone. As Europe faced reconstruction after
World War II, Sir William Beveridge submitted his report, Social
Insurance and Allied Services, frequently cited as a foundational
document of the modern welfare state, to the government of the
United Kingdom in 1942.139 This was shortly before the
international aid effort for the reconstruction of Europe (including
establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944 and the
Marshall Plan speech in 1947). The Beveridge report laid out three
guiding principles for a comprehensive social safety net:
The first principle is that any proposals for the future [should
be comprehensive]. Now, when the war is abolishing landmarks
of every kind, is the opportunity for using experience in a clear
field. A revolutionary moment in the world’s history is a time for
revolutions, not for patching.
The second principle is that . . . social insurance should be
treated as one part only of a comprehensive policy of social
progress. Social insurance fully developed may provide income
security; it is an attack upon Want. But Want is one only of five
giants on the road of reconstruction and in some ways the easiest
to attack. The others are Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness.
The third principle is that social security must be achieved by
co-operation between the State and the individual. The State
should offer security for service and contribution. The State in
organising security should not stifle incentive, opportunity,
responsibility; in establishing a national minimum, it should leave
room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual
to provide more than that minimum for himself and his family. 140

The proposed baseline, then, was an economic safety net—a
minimum economic right of individuals, provided by the state

138. In particular, race in America. See Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser & Bruce
Sacerdote, Why Doesn’t the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?, 2 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 187 (2001) (comparing racial compositions and views of poverty
in America and Western European countries); STARR, supra note 134, at 269 (explaining how
race was a factor in removing healthcare from the U.S. Social Security Act of 1935).
139. WILLIAM BEVERIDGE, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES 1 (1942),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/19_07_05_beveridge.pdf.
140. Id. at 6–7.
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through compulsory contributions (taxation), and separate
arrangements for healthcare and education.
2. The Charter
The 1945 United Nations Charter itself further developed
international expectations of a state, while emphasizing domestic
discretion and expressly precluding international enforcement of
many of those expectations. In the preparatory negotiations for the
Charter at Dumbarton Oaks, the Great Powers recognized the need
to set limits on domestic state conduct that threatened international
security, but they also sought to ensure that they would not be
compelled to intervene, and, more urgently, that the new
international organization could not enforce standards they might
establish internationally against themselves domestically.
Even with these caveats, the Chinese delegation caused
complications when it proposed “that there should be a clear
overarching commitment to the principle of racial equality, and to
human rights in general.”141 The American and British delegations,
joined by the Russians, again expressed concern about domestic
implications. The latter two opposed reference to human rights at
all. The American delegation insisted on including human rights,
but also created insulation against enforcement thereof. As Mark
Mazower describes,
President Roosevelt had let it be known privately that he was
strongly in favour of some reference to human rights. The
administration felt caught between the Scylla of isolationists,
anxious to preserve the constitution of the U[nited] S[tates] from
outside intervention [, and to forestall international pressure on
domestic U.S. racial policies], and the Charybdis of
internationalists who were inspired by Roosevelt’s idealistic
rhetoric and believed the administration should take seriously its
mission of building a freer world. Hence the Americans proposed
a formulation which would allow them to have their cake and eat
it too, posing as defenders of both universal human rights and
domestic state rights.
The International Organization should refrain from
intervention in the internal affairs of any state, it being the
responsibility of each state to see that conditions prevailing within
141. Mazower, supra note 131, at 391.
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its jurisdiction do not endanger international peace and security
and, to this end, to respect the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of all its people and to govern in accordance with the
principles of humanity and justice. 142

Thus, Article 2 of the Charter reaffirms the concept of
sovereignty first established by the League of Nations, stating, “All
members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state. . . .”143
Though territorial sovereignty is typically characterized as a
defensive mechanism for former colonies, it bears noting that the
Great Powers did not agree to it as a concession to them; they
insisted on it as insurance against commitments to them—and were
partly motivated by hopefully outdated views on racial
discrimination.144 (The U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting
Rights Act of 1965 were still twenty years away at the time.)
Elsewhere, the Charter established an international standard—
or, at least, expectation—for domestic governance.145 Article 1(3) set
out among the United Nation’s purposes “[t]o achieve international
cooperation in solving international problems of an economic,
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all.”146 Article 55 in Chapter IX, on International
Economic and Social Cooperation, elaborates,
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations
shall promote:
higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions
of economic and social progress and development;

142. Id. at 391–92 (quoting PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN (1998)).
143. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
144. Mohney, supra note 131, at 839.
145. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
146. Id. art. 1, ¶ 3.

1075

3.KHARDORI_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/28/2021 1:00 AM

46:4 (2021)

solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational
cooperation; and
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion.147

Granted, unlike security issues under the purview of
the Security Council, these expectations for the state have no
binding enforcement mechanism. Other than asking the Security
Council to consider security-related implications of an issue,
the main recourse for the Economic and Social Council is to
send “recommendations” to an individual member state or the
General Assembly.148
3. The trusteeship system
Along with the aspirational statement on state responsibilities,
the U.N. Charter also included a Trusteeship Council to continue
the transition from colonialism started by the League of Nations’
Mandate system. Under the U.N. Charter, the trusteeship system
is arguably the only binding guidance for expectations of a state.
Chapters XII and XIII established the U.N. Trusteeship System
and the Trusteeship Council to oversee it. The system was
effectively limited to the remaining trustee arrangements from
the League of Nations’ Mandate system, and the Council was
disbanded in 1994 upon the independence of the final Trust
territory, though it technically remains available to be recalled by
the General Assembly.149
Chapter XII specified expectations of trustees and criteria for
independence of the trust territories. Article 76 listed “basic
objectives” of the system, including
to promote the political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and
their progressive development towards self-government or
independence as may be appropriate to the particular
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely

147. Id. art. 55.
148. Id. art. 62, ¶ 2.
149. Trusteeship Council Res. 2200 (LXI), at 2 (May 25, 1994).
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expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be
provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of
the peoples of the world; and
to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial
matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals,
and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of
justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing
objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80. 150

Article 88 required administering trustees to submit annual
reports on “the political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory.”151 The
deliberations for the provisional (template) questionnaire focused
on infrastructure, education, and social services, including health
insurance, as well as political rights (and non-discrimination in all
of these).152 In reality, the trust territories petitioned for and
ultimately were granted their independence in the absence of
robust implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights, but
the marker of expectations was at least there.
E. Human Rights: Nonbinding and Binding
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
A few years later, the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights presented the next evolutionary leap. It was much
more specific than anything that preceded it, though still
expressly nonbinding. Eleanor Roosevelt led the U.S. delegation,
with instructions from the State Department to not agree
to a binding covenant at the time. For her part, she convincingly
argued that a nonbinding declaration would be an immediate
statement and beacon for the world, while avoiding the damaging
counter-narrative of American rejection—almost certain defeat in a
U.S. domestic ratification debate with American southern state
150. U.N. Charter art. 76(b)–(d).
151. Id. art. 88.
152. U.N. TCOR, 1st Sess., Compilation of Questions in the Formulation of
Questionnaires: Item 8 of the Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. T/9 (Mar. 25, 1947).
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senators.153 She also successfully advocated within the U.S.
delegation and directly with President Truman to agree to include
economic, social, and cultural rights in the declaration at all. (She
directly invoked President Roosevelt’s New Deal and the Four
Freedoms speech.)154
The resulting Declaration states in its preamble that it is “a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations.”155 It includes several provisions on civil and political
rights and liberties:
Article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.
Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Article 20:
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
Article 21:
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in
his country.
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government;
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or
by equivalent free voting procedures.156

And it includes several provisions on economic, social, and
cultural rights:
153. Mohney, supra note 131, at 853–56.
154. MICHELIN R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE
GLOBALIZATION ERA 222 (2d. ed. 2008).
155. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948).
156. Id. arts. 18–21 (emphasis added).
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Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security
of person.
Article 22: Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social
security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and
international co-operation and in accordance with the
organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and
cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development
of his personality.
Article 23:
Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment,
to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection
against unemployment.
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for
equal work.
Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human
dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of
social protection.
Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
Article 25(1): Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of [personal tragedy]
beyond his control.
Article 26:
1) Everyone has the right to education. . . .
2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms. . . .157

This is all to say, the Declaration spoke at length about several
rights the state should be responsible for, but expressly did not hold
them to any of it. Under the circumstances, it was a strategic
success. It sent a message and established a norm, and the ensuing
decades would prove Eleanor Roosevelt right: the U.S. Senate

157. Id. arts. 3, 22–23, 25–26 (emphasis added).
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rejected attempts at binding human rights commitments even
decades later.
2. The International Bill of Rights: Two covenants
In December 1950, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 421 (V)
called for the Commission on Human Rights, under the direction
of the U.N.’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), to draft a
single, binding “International Covenant on Human Rights,”
including “provisions rendering it obligatory for States to promote
the implementation of the human rights and fundamental
freedoms proclaimed [therein] to take the necessary steps . . . to
guarantee to everyone the real opportunity of enjoying those rights
and freedoms.”158
Almost immediately, that commission recognized the two
key questions: How exactly would states implement such rights?
And to what extent would the international community be
responsible to provide assistance?159 They observed that civil
and political rights are individual rights against the state; they
could be legislated, implemented, and enforced within a state
through courts. But economic, social, and cultural rights would be
more complicated.
Daniel Whelan summarized the challenge of economic, social,
and cultural rights:
Of significant difficulty for the Commission in 1951—and indeed
for us today—was determining the scope of obligations and the
appropriate international institutional mechanisms for the
protection and promotion of economic, social, and cultural rights.
Do the obligations rest solely on states-parties, and how strong
are those obligations? Should international assistance be made
available to states-parties in order for them to meet their
obligations? Would states be required to seek assistance from the
international community to meet their obligations? Would they
have a right to assistance? What, exactly, would “assistance”
include? Would Western states, independent of the U.N. and its
specialized agencies, have obligations to developing states? 160

158. G.A. Res. 421(V) (Dec. 4, 1950).
159. DANIEL J. WHELAN, INDIVISIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 96 (2010).
160. Id.
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For the newly independent former colonial states, sovereignty
and protection against foreign intervention without their consent
was important, but they also saw a role for international assistance
to help meet their domestic governance responsibilities. For former
colonial powers and other advanced economies, the primary goal
was to avoid a binding duty to provide assistance; they preferred
to maintain discretion to provide assistance—as they had since the
League of Nations and to this day. In those early 1951 negotiations,
Yugoslavia proposed a clause on international cooperation,
whereby “Signatory States whose economic situation was difficult
would thus be aware that they could rely on help from the
international community in implementing economic, social and
cultural rights.”161 India’s representative, Hansa Mehta, added that
India would agree to a term that expressly established an
affirmative international responsibility to assist. She even offered a
framework: India would support such a term
if the meaning was that when the resources of a State were
inadequate it would receive international help on certain
conditions which it would have to accept. . . . It should be for a
State to declare that its resources are inadequate and to ask the
United Nations for assistance, which should be granted provided
the request was justified.162

This approach was not adopted. From the would-be donor
government perspective, Mrs. Roosevelt made clear that the United
States would not support an interpretation that would, as Whelan
put it, “translate states-parties’ national obligations to progressively
implement economic, social, and cultural rights through
international cooperation into interstate obligations—rights-claims
for development assistance.”163 She also accurately predicted the
U.S. Senate would not ratify a covenant with economic, social, and
cultural rights.164 Fellow U.S. representative, John Humphrey,
supported a system whereby states self-report progress toward
implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights, which
donor governments and U.N. agencies would use to guide—but
not compel—their assistance. While also reaffirming the view that
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 98 (quoting U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/SR.232, 13) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 98 (quoting U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/SR.233, 11–12).
Id. at 108.
Id. at 110.
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facilitating these rights are a domestic state responsibility, he wrote,
“The idea is to help governments to fulfil their obligations rather
than to penalize them for violations; and use is made of the
technical assistance program.”165
As originally conceived, all of the rights in the Universal
Declaration were meant to work together. Economic, social, and
cultural rights were supposed to be necessary pre-conditions for
the exercise of civil and political rights.166 The U.N. General
Assembly resolution calling for a binding follow-up to the
declaration had, after all, expressly contemplated that all of the
rights needed to coexist, observing,
[T]he enjoyment of civil and political freedoms and of economic,
social and
cultural
rights are interconnected and
interdependent. . . . [W]hen deprived of economic, social, and
cultural rights, man does not represent the human person whom
the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] regards as the ideal
of the free man.167

But it was not to be. Recognizing the impasse, India proposed
to split the two sets of rights into the two separate covenants that
now exist.168 The United States supported this; the Soviet Union
opposed but was ultimately overruled dozens of meetings and
multiple votes later.169
Even after the proposed “International Bill of Rights” was split
into two, it would still take decades to complete them: the U.N.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the U.N. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) were each adopted in 1966 and ratified in 1976.
For the United States, Jimmy Carter, the first Democratic President
since their adoption, signed both in 1977. And the U.S. Senate
ratified ICCPR in 1992, within months of also passing the

165. Id. at 102 (quoting 2 JOHN HUMPHREY, ON THE EDGE OF GREATNESS: THE DIARIES OF
JOHN HUMPHREY, FIRST DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
1950–1951, 210 (A.J. Hobbins ed., McGill University Libraries, 1996)).
166. Id. at 106.
167. G.A. Res. 421(V), ¶ 6 (Dec. 4, 1950).
168. WHELAN, supra note 159, at 106.
169. Id. at 107.
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FREEDOM Support Act to promote democracy in former Soviet
states.170 As of 2020, the U.S. Senate has not ratified ICESCR.
For its part, the ICCPR acknowledged the link between civil and
political rights and those in the ICESCR. Article 1(1) states, “All
peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development.”171 It sets out the
following civil and political rights:
Article 6: Right to life. “Every human being has the inherent right
to life. . . . No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”
Article 7: Prohibition on “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment.”
Article 8: Ban on slavery.
Article 9: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security
of person.”
Article 14: Rule of law. “All persons shall be equal before the
courts and tribunals.”
Article 17: Right to Privacy. “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home,
or correspondence . . . .”
Article 18: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion.”
Article 19: Freedom of expression.
Article 21: “The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.”
Article 22: Freedom of association.
Article 25: Right to vote. “Every citizen shall have the right and
the opportunity . . . without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take
part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives; (b) To vote . . . at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall

170. Jimmy Carter, U.S. Finally Ratifies Human Rights Covenant, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Jun. 29, 1992), https://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc1369.html;
Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102–511, 106 Stat. 3320.
171. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, ¶ 1, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the
will of the electors.”172

The ICESCR has the same Article 1(1) as the ICCPR, further
linking the two sets of rights.173 Its Preamble recognizes that
in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and
want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby
everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as
well as his civil and political rights.174

The ICESCR clause on state responsibility and international
cooperation, Article 2(1), provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take
steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant
by all appropriate means . . . .175

So, each state party accepted the responsibility to work toward
full realization of these rights, subject to trade-offs they may make
based on financial and other constraints. They committed to
collaborate through international assistance, but this collaboration
was left to discretion and negotiation; it is not automatic or
compelled. The specific rights the state parties committed to work
toward include the following:
Article 7: Labor rights. “[T]he right of everyone to the enjoyment
of just and favourable conditions of work,” which expressly
includes fair pay; living wages (“a decent living for themselves
and their families”); and “[s]afe and healthy working conditions.”
Article 9: Social security, “including social insurance,” i.e., a social
safety net.
Article 11: Freedom from hunger. Anti-poverty protections (as an
aspirational goal that may require voluntary foreign aid). “[T]he
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living . . . including
172. Id. arts. 6–9, 14, 17–19, 21–22, 25.
173. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, ¶ 1, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
174. Id. pmbl.
175. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1.
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adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right,
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international
co-operation based on free consent.”
Article 12: Health care. “[T]he right of everyone to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”
Article 13: Education as a necessary condition for full exercise of
political and other rights. “[T]he right of everyone to education.
[States Parties] agree that education shall be directed to the full
development of the human personality and the sense of its
dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall
enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society,
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all
nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the
activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.”
This provision states that primary education “shall be compulsory
and available free to all,” and secondary and higher education
shall be made generally available and “accessible to all,” with a
goal of “the progressive introduction of free education.”176

The enforcement mechanism here—more appropriately
described as an implementation monitoring process—is for the
States Parties to submit periodic progress reports to ECOSOC,
which can inform development assistance activities of U.N.
agencies and other governments.177 ECOSOC may also forward
reports and information to the Commission on Human Rights
for recommendations.178
The arc of “development” enterprise, from the concept of state
sovereignty to popular sovereignty to colonialism to the
unwinding of colonial empires has held to a pattern: the great
powers of their eras dictated to the rest of the world the standards
for legitimate and functional statehood; as they clarified these
concepts, two ideas remained constant: they should not be judged
by these standards, and they should not be forced to assist in other
states’ attainment thereof.

176. Id. arts. 7, 9, 11–13.
177. Id. arts. 16–22.
178. Id. art. 29.
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F. Enter “the Right to Development”: The Developing
Countries’ Response
By the 1970s, the ranks of former colonies and other newly
independent members of the United Nations had reached a critical
mass, and they had a forum—for nonbinding declarations, at
least—in the General Assembly. Several allied to articulate a
developing country perspective in the international discourse.
Their first sustained response was a proposal for a “new
international economic order” (NIEO), which would re-shape
institutions and relationships away from great power dominance
toward a more level playing field.179 It did not succeed, but it
introduced concepts that have helped shape the development
dialogue, including the idea of the right to development.
In 1986, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on
the Right to Development as a nonbinding resolution.180 Its
preamble observed “that under the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights everyone is entitled to a social and
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in
that Declaration can be fully realized” (also citing the ICCPR and
ICESCR).181 Its articles expressly framed the full range of civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural rights as “indivisible and
interdependent” human rights and state responsibilities:182
Article 1(1): The right to development is an inalienable human right by
virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled
to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural
and political development, in which all human rights and
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.
Article 3(1): States have the primary responsibility for the creation of
national and international conditions favourable to the realization
of the right to development.
Article 6:
....

179. ISABELLA BUNN, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:
LEGAL AND MORAL DIMENSIONS 35–36 (2012).
180. G.A. Res. 41/128, supra note 5, pmbl.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and
interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be
given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights.
States should take steps to eliminate obstacles to development
resulting from failure to observe civil and political rights, as well as
economic, social and cultural rights.183

It also calls for an international responsibility or duty to provide
development assistance:
Article 3(3): States have the duty to cooperate with each other in
ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development.
States should realize their rights and fulfil their duties in such
manner as to promote a new international economic order based
on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and
cooperation among all States . . . .184

This, predictably, has been the main obstacle to donor
government support. The United States voted against this
nonbinding resolution; eight other donor governments
abstained.185 For the United States, the Reagan administration
expressed ideological opposition to economic, social, and cultural
rights. In the drafting negotiations, U.S. representative Michel
Novak rejected the idea of a right to international assistance,
asserting that individuals had a responsibility to develop
themselves. In his words,
[I]n addressing this item, my delegation finds it useful to translate
the phrase “right to development” into terms rooted in our
own experience. . . .
In 1881 . . . no one spoke of a “right to development.” But our
nation had an opportunity to develop, perhaps even a responsibility
to develop. Our people knew that a responsibility to develop was
imposed on them by their own capabilities and blessings, and by
their new ideas about political economy.186

183. Id. arts. 1, 3, 6 (emphasis added).
184. Id. art. 3, ¶ 3.
185. Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137, 138, 142–43 (2004).
186. Id. at 144 (perhaps making a cultural assertion, evoking Max Weber’s “Protestant
Work Ethic”).
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This was an ahistorical assertion, to put it mildly, ignoring
among other things the developmental gains in the United States
that resulted from the New Deal era. Regardless, the U.S.
delegation also expressed a longstanding, ideologically neutral U.S.
position that foreign assistance should be a foreign policy tool
subject to each government’s discretion, not a compulsion or duty.
U.S. administrations have consistently opposed a binding
commitment to provide international assistance for a right to
development. Even the Democratic Clinton and Obama
administrations consistently abstained from any measures
advancing a “right to development.”187
Notably, around the same time as the Declaration on the Right
to Development, a separate U.N. World Commission on
Environment and Development issued a report in 1987, Our
Common Future (also referred to as the Bruntland Report) that
created the term “sustainable development.” It framed the
environment as a global commons and international security issue,
for which all states should take additional precautions and incur
additional costs when implementing development activities.188 It
proposed additional burdens on states, to which a coalition of
developing countries responded by calling on donor governments
to facilitate “technology transfer”—to help them gain access to
industrial technology at less than full market costs. To this day,
there have been no concrete commitments on this—per the donor
government position that they should not be compelled to provide
foreign assistance, though they may choose to as a matter of foreign
policy discretion.189
Since then, the most notable statements of international
expectations for state responsibility for development are the 2000
187. See, e.g., U.S. MISSION TO INT’L ORG. IN GENEVA, Item 1: Decision Adoption—
EOV by the United States of America—Right to Development Resolution (Oct. 1, 2009),
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2009/10/01/item-1-right-to-development/.
188. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE, ch. 1, ¶ 27 (1987),
http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf.
189. For example, for all the urgency of the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change,
the agreement itself only goes so far as to “recognize the importance of . . . technology
transfer and capacity-building,” committing “[d]eveloped country Parties” only to “provide
information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support provided to
developing country Parties.” Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Paris Agreement, art. 6, ¶ 8, art. 13, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/paris-climate-change-conferencenovember-2015/paris-agreement.
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U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the follow-on
2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The nonbinding 2000
U.N. Millennium Declaration observed, “Responsibility for
managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as
threats to international peace and security, must be shared among
the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally.”190
It set out goals in eight areas, including eradicating hunger and
poverty, achieving universal primary education, improving public
health infrastructure (with a focus on communicable diseases and
maternal health), and improving environmental sustainability.191
The 2015 follow-on SDGs go into more detail, with more
categories of goals in more areas of governance. These include,
among others:
• No poverty,
• No hunger,
• Good health,
• Clean water and sanitation,
• Renewable energy,
• Good jobs and economic growth,
• Innovation and infrastructure,
• Sustainable cities,
• Climate action, and
• Peace and justice.192

The health goals include “achiev[ing] universal health
coverage, including financial risk protection.”193 The education
goals include “free, equitable and quality primary and secondary
education,” and literacy for all youth.194 The goals for peace and
justice include promoting rule of law; developing “effective,
190. G.A. Res. 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration (Sept. 18, 2000),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/55/2.
191. Id.
192. G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/
RES/70/1&Lang=E.
193. Id. at 16 (Goal 3).
194. Id. at 17 (Goal 4).
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accountable and transparent institutions at all levels”; and ensuring
“responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decisionmaking at all levels.”195
Notably, the resolution for the SDGs also expressly invokes the
Declaration on the Right to Development. It states,
The new Agenda is guided by the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations. . . . It is grounded in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international human
rights treaties, the Millennium Declaration, and the 2005 World
Summit Outcome. It is informed by . . . the Declaration on the
Right to Development.196

In January 2020, a working group under the U.N. Human
Rights Council produced a first draft of a proposed binding
international covenant on the Right to Development. It does well to
draw many of the connections discussed here, between the rights
that already exist and between domestic governance and
international interests. The draft Preamble frames it as
[e]mphasizing that the right to development is an inalienable
human right of all human persons and peoples, . . .
....
[r]ecognizing that development is a comprehensive economic,
social, cultural, civil, and political process that aims at the
constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population
and of all individuals . . .,
....
[r]eaffirming the universality, indivisibility, interrelatedness,
interdependence, and mutually reinforcing nature of all civil,
cultural, economic, political and social rights, including the right
to development, [and]
....
[c]onsidering that peace and security at all levels is an essential
element for the realization of the right to development and that
such realization can, in turn, contribute to the establishment,

195. Id. at 25 (Goal 16).
196. Id. at 4.
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maintenance and strengthening of peace and security at
all levels . . . . 197

Other provisions assert something that could be interpreted as
a binding commitment on the international community to provide
assistance. Draft Article 4, defining the right to development, states,
Every human person and all peoples have the inalienable right
to development by virtue of which they are entitled to participate
in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural, civil and
political development that is consistent with and based on all
other human rights and fundamental freedoms. 198

The reference to “peoples” raises the possibility that the right is
more than an individual human right, and potentially also a state
right at the international level. Articles 10, 11, and 12 describe an
“obligation to respect,” “obligation to protect,” and “obligation to
fulfil” the right to development.199 These clearly place a
responsibility on the state vis-à-vis its people. Articles 12 and 13 go
potentially further on international cooperation: The former states,
“Each State Party undertakes to take measures, individually and
through international assistance and cooperation, with a view to
progressively enhancing the right to development. . . .”200 The latter
adds an international “duty to cooperate” through “joint and
separate action.”201 Based on the history of international
commitments—in particular, donor states’ reticence to be required
to provide assistance—a covenant with a provision to this effect is
extremely unlikely to ever gain the support of the governments
with the most resources to provide aid. For better or worse, foreign
intervention or assistance in any form has always been a
discretionary act.
At this point, there have been enough statements on the
appropriate substance of development and the role of the state in
facilitating it to form a consensus—albeit nonbinding—
understanding. The state is bound internally by the social compact
197. Draft Convention on the Right to Development, Working Group on the Right to
Development, Hum. Rts Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.2/21/2 (Jan. 17, 2020),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/Session21/3_A_HRC_WG.2_2
1_2_AdvanceEditedVersion.pdf.
198. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added).
199. Id. arts. 10–12.
200. Id. art. 12.
201. Id. art. 13.
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with its people and externally by its commitments as a member of
the international community. To the extent there is a human right
to develop (made up of civil, political, economic, social, and
cultural rights) and a state responsibility to protect, there is
necessarily a state responsibility to develop.
IV. CONCLUSION: SYNTHESIZING A “RESPONSIBILITY TO DEVELOP”
Across the spectrum of potential motivations for international
development assistance, from individual human rights to
international security, there is a common interest in the
development enterprise among all actors, at the individual,
national, and international levels. These actors can coordinate
constructively toward the end of providing meaningful
international development assistance, or they can negotiate the
consequences of failures to do so. R2P is now a recognized tool for
dealing with the consequences—even if it is never used again.
History shows it has always been an option even before it was ever
specifically articulated. The RTD campaign has sought to compel
cooperation to help preempt the R2P option. But history shows that
is extremely unlikely to happen; foreign assistance has never
worked that way. A potentially more feasible approach to increase
the mutually understood urgency of international development
cooperation would be to more expressly link it to R2P. R2P already
implicitly includes a broad spectrum of domestic governance
responsibilities. Expressly agreeing to a domestic “responsibility to
develop” as a corollary to R2P could help do that. It would not
compel international assistance, but it could help encourage and
focus it.
Re-framing the discourse around a state “responsibility to
develop” would reduce possible opposition to a binding
international commitment, while highlighting a link to the
“responsibility to protect” and potential international security
implications, which in turn could increase the perceived urgency of
international assistance. It would keep primary responsibility for
the development effort, including cultivation of the full range of
individual human rights, at the individual state level but could help
the international community—governments and their people—
recognize their self-interest in providing assistance toward
that purpose.
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In the one hundred years since the League of Nations Charter
purportedly drew the line of absolute territorial sovereignty, the
international community has become increasingly specific about
the expected responsibilities of a legitimate state. And it has always
recognized the impact of domestic governance on international
security, going back to the Treaty of Westphalia. For all the
individual human rights that have been—and may eventually be—
recognized, the conduct of the state is a necessary condition; the
state has a counterpart responsibility. Whether the international
community chooses to enforce it or not, a precedent has been set:
the state has a responsibility to protect—to provide security and
respect liberty at home to ensure domestic stability—and in so
doing contribute to international security. As a necessary condition
for any human right to development, and as a logical corollary to a
responsibility to protect, the state has a “responsibility to develop.”
On this much, there appears to be consensus. Any attempt to seek
further binding agreement or promote international cooperation
should focus on that.
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